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FIFTH AMENDMENT-IMPEACHMENT
further exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary
rule. 9 Though the Court did not use Harris as an
opportunity to reverse Miranda8o and in many
71 Cf. United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970) (Illegally
obtained evidence can be used by trial court during
sentencing deliberations, regardless of admissibility at
trial of guilt); Nettles v. State, -_Fla. Supp_, 248
So. 2d 259 (1971) (Miranda warnings not required in
confession to probation officer).
80 Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
490 (1971) (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.) (Law of
states and federal circuits the collateral impeach-
ment rule remains narrower than what Harris per-
mits,"' a new majority attitude towards the rights
of the accused is evident.
search and seizure needs an overhaul, starting with
overruling of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (dissenting
opinion of Burger, C.J.) (Whole Exclusionary Rule
needs legislative overhaul, but Mapp and Weeks need
not be overruled).
81 See cases collected in notes 44-45, 47 supra.
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Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire' the Supreme
Court restricted the scope of warrantless search and
seizure by limiting the use of the automobile2 and
plain view3 exceptions to the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment. 4
The body of a fourteen-year-old New Hamp-
shire girl was found several miles from her home
near a major highway. Police investigation re-
vealed that Edward Coolidge's automobile had
been observed stopped alongside the highway
where the girl's body was discovered. Upon this in-
formation, the police secured an automobile search
warrant and then seized the vehicle a few hours
'91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
2 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
The Court construed the fourth amendment[Als recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a proper official warrant readily
may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor
boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant be-
cause the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction....
Id. at 153. See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42(1971); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
1 Seizure of evidence found by the police in plain
view has consistently been treated as an exception to
the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U.S. 371 (1969); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
4 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
after they arrested Coolidge inside his home. The
vehicle was searched three times-two days, eleven
months, and fourteen months later-and vacuumed
for possible evidence. The vacuum sweepings were
introduced at trial. Also introduced against
Coolidge were guns and clothing he owned which
his wife had voluntarily given the police. The Court
quickly dismissed the contention that the latter
evidence had been obtained illegally, holding that
good faith efforts of a wife could not be construed
as a search and seizure under the fourth amend-
ment.5
The Supreme Court has long made it clear that a
search warrant, to be constitutionally valid, must
be issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." 6
In Coolidge, the warrant was issued by a New
Hampshire magistrate who was also the state At-
torney General and later chief prosecutor at Coo-
lidge's trial. Although this satisfied state law,7 the
Court held the magistrate's triple-function to be a
per se violation of the "neutral and detached"
standard,8 irrespective of any showing of probable
cause to issue the warrant.9 Mr. justice Black, dis-
senting, contended that the only fourth amendment
requirement for issuing a warrant is probable cause
and, therefore, the triple-function was harmless
5 91 S. Ct. at 2050.
6 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 595:1 (repealed 1969).
8 91 S. Ct. at 2029.
9 Id. at 2023. See also Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
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error, if error at all.10 Although he did not directly
attack the "neutral and detached" standard, Black
implied that he would reach the same conclusion
even if the magistrate did, in fact, lack neutrality,
as long as probable cause was shown and the state
law complied with.n
Finding the search warrant invalid, the Court
turned to the question of whether the automobile
search fell within any of "a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions" to the war-
rant requirement.12 The exceptions at issue in
Coolidge were search incident to arrest,13 evidence
found in plain view,14 and automobile searches1
Unable to apply the holding in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia,'1 the most recent case on search incident to
arrest, because of its own decision not to apply it
retrospectively, 7 the Court turned to the pre-
Chimel law embodied in United States v. Rabino-
witz. s In Rabinowitz, the Court held that the rea-
sonableness of a search incident to arrest is to be
determined by the facts and circumstances of each
case, limited to those areas in the possession and
under the control of the arrestee. In Coolidge, the
vehicle was seized in the defendant's driveway two
and one-half hours after the defendant was arrested
in his home. The Court viewed this seizure as un-
reasonable, observing that "even under Rabinowitz
'a search may be incident to an arrest only if it is
10 91 S. Ct. at 2055.
1 The New Hampshire Supreme Court held in
effect that the state attorney general's participa-
tion in the investigation of the case at the time
he issued the search warrant was harmless error
if it was error at all. I agree. It is difficult to
imagine a clearer showing of probable cause.
There was no possibility of prejudice because
there was no room for discretion. Indeed, it
could be said that a refusal to issue a warrant on
the showing of probable cause made in this case
would have been an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 2055-56 (Black, J., dissenting).
The inapplicability of any of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement makes a search without a warrant
per se unreasonable as violative of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 2032. See also Chimel v. California 395
U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
13 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
11 See note 3 supra.15 See note 2 supra.
16 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (A search incident to arrest
must be limited to the arrestee's "immediate control"
for the sole purpose of removing possible weapons and
finding evidence before it can be destroyed).
17 Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
Justice Harlan implies in his concurring opinion in
Coolidge that he concurred because he felt Chimel
should be applied retroactively. 91 S. Ct. at 2051.
18 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and
is confined to the immediate vicinity of the ar-
rest.' " s In his dissent, Justice Black drew the
issue as one of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment, and stated that "the test of reason-
ableness cannot be governed by such arbitrary
rules." 20 Because the automobile, in plain view of
the police arresting Coolidge, fit the description of
the one they were seeking, Justice Black felt it
could reasonably be seized.21
For the Court, any warrantless search is invalid
if it does not fall within one of the defined, excep-
tions. 2 This is best illustrated by the Court's rejec-
tion of the automobile search exception as applica-
ble to the search in Coolidge. In a landmark deci-
sion, Carroll v. United States,2" the Court held that
19 1 S. Ct. at 2033, quoting from Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970).
Because this Court has held that police arrest-
ing a defendant on the street in front of his house
cannot go into that house and make a general
search it follows, says the majority, that the police
having entered a house to make an arrest cannot
step outside the house to seize dearly visible evi-
dence.
91 S. Ct. at 2056 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Ship-
ley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969); Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
The Court attempted to strengthen its argument by
citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964),
for the proposition that even if they could search the
automobile in the driveway when the police arrested
Coolidge they could not seize it, remove it, and later
search it. 91 S. Ct. at 2033. Preston had been arrested
for vagrancy and there was apparently no probable
cause to search his automobile. Thus the justification
for the search was not under the automobile doctrine
but rather as a search incident to arrest, and the Court
held this was not permissible at the station house. But
when the original justification is probable cause to
search an automobile under Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970), applies instead. In Chambers, the Court
held that if the police can search an automobile under
Carroll they can also search it later at the station house.
In light of Chimel v. California and its restrictive
definition of search incident to arrest, it is unlikely
that a Preston case will actually ever again anse.
20 91 S. Ct. at 2056.
21Justice Black's approach to search and seizure is
premised on a strictly literal reading of the fourth
amendment, which appears, when compared to the ap-
proach of the Court, to confuse the plain view and
search incident to arrest doctrines. He seems to feel
that the search incident to arrest doctrine is not limited
by time or distance from th& arrest insofar as plain
view evidence is concerned. Since the fourth amend-
ment prohibits only "unreasonable" search and seizure,
Black feels that reasonableness should be determined
from the facts and circumstances of each case un-
hindered by the "arbitrary rules" the Court imposes.
See id. at 2056.
2 d. at 2032. See also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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the police may make a warrantless search of an
automobile whenever they have probable cause to
do so. Modifying Carroll, the Coolidge Court held
that even if there is probable cause to search, a war-
rant is necessary if the vehicle lacks mobility. 4
Thus the automobile's mobility, not the vehicle
itself, creates the exception.25
Justice Black argued for the applicability of both
Carroll and Chambers v. Maroney,28 in which the
Court reaffirmed the Carroll principle, holding that
once probable cause to search an automobile ob-
tains, it is not lost if the police first transport the
vehicle to the station house. Black cited Chambers
for the proposition that an automobile seized with
probable cause did not lose its mobility when later
searched at the police station.27 For Justice Black,
an automobile could hardly be less "mobile" than
when it rests guarded in a police garage, yet the




Justice White, dissenting, also disagreed with the
Court's rationale which failed to apply Carroll and
Clumbers. Citing a series of automobile cases,
White observed:
Each of them approved the search of a vehicle
that was no longer moving and, with the occupants
in custody, no more likely to move than the unat-
2The Court viewed the language in Carroll, "where
it is not practicable to obtain a warrant," 267 U.S. at
153, as meaning some automobiles are mobile while
others are not and, when they are not mobile, it is
practicable to obtain a warrant. But the sentence in
which that phrase is located can also be read to mean
that an automobile must be treated as mobile or im-
minently mobile and, therefore, rarely subject to the
warrant prerequisite. Such an interpretation would
make the word "where" interchangeable with the word
"because," and the automobile cases prior to Coolidge
appear to have applied such reasoning, assuming that
all vehicles are mobile.
11 The Court said, "There was probable cause, but
no exigent circumstances justified the police in proceed-
ing without a warrant." 91 S. Ct. at 2037.
26 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
21 "The probable cause factor still obtained at the
station house and so did the mobility of the car." 91
S. Ct. at 2057, quoting from 399 U.S. at 52.
2 Probable cause existed in both Chambers and
Coolidge, and mobility is not a factor in determining
probable cause. Since Chambers and Coolidge both in-
volved an automobile search upon probable cause after
delivery to the station house there is one possible ex-
planation for the disparity in the holdings-the deter-
mination of mobility is made at the time of seizure, not
the time of the later search. Therefore, if an automobile
is mobile when seized it retains its mobility at the sta-
tion house; if it is not mobile when seized it will not
later be mobile. The logic is appalling, yet apparently
supported by Chambers. See note 27 supra, particularly
use of the word "still."
tended but movable vehicle parked on the street or
in the driveway of a person's house.u
Nevertheless, Justice White declined Li ie4 on
Chambers due to the fact that the last two searches
were so remote in time from the vehicle's seizure.
He looked instead to the plain view exception to
validate the search.
The Court approached the "plain view" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement in a manner similar
to that of the automobile exception. The Court ex-
plained that any item will be in "plain view" prior
to its seizure and that, therefore, it is the presence
of other circumstances, not merely plain view,
which validates the search."0 Where the police had
knowledge of the object and its location beforehand
and intended to seize it, the Court deemed it con-
stitutionally unreasonable, absent exigent circum-
stances, to proceed without a warrant. However,
where the object in plain view was come upon "in-
advertently," seizure was permissible. 1 The Court
concluded that the police had not come upon
Coolidge's automobile inadvertently and held the
plain view exception inapplicable.
Justices Black and White, dissenting in separate
opinions, disagreed with this result. Justice Black
argued that no searches would ever be made if
police did not expect to discover evidence. In fact,
he concluded, no evidence seized incident to arrest
is truly unexpected.3 2 Justice White asserted that
the police did not know that the automobile would
be parked at Coolidge's house, and, therefore, the
discovery of it in the driveway was truly inad-
vertent.33
The thrust of Coolidge thus restricts the scope of
the automobile and plain view exceptions. In light
2 91 S. Ct. at 2067 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White thus underscores the problem of determining
when a car is, in fact, mobile. In Coolidge, the vehicle
was considered immobile because Coolidge was in cus-
tody, the house was being watched, and his wife was
taken from the home to stay elsewhere-in short, the
possibilities of the car being moved were very slight.
Justice White's statement definitely suggests that al-
most all automobile searches validated in the past are
little different, if at all different, from the one in
Coolidge.
30 Id. at 2037.
31 Id. at 2040.
1 Id. at 2059. The disagreement between Justice
Black and the Court appears to be in the interpreta-
tion of the words "anticipation" and "expectation."
Black argued that officers always expect to find evi-
dence-that that is the purpose of searching. The
majority based its decision on the anticipation of dis-




of Coolidge, it may be appropriate to rename them
the "mobility" and "inadvertency" doctrines, re-
spectively. In each case the practicability of ob-
taining a warrant is a major factor and exigent cir-
cumstances such as mobility and inadvertency will,
according to the Court, only validate the seizure of
some automobiles and some evidence found in plain
view."4
Ultimately the Coolidge decision raises the ques-
tion whether good faith in obtaining a warrant,
which is found invalid on grounds other than lack
of probable cause, should assure the legality of any
search made pursuant to it. In Coolidge, the invalid
automobile search warrant was conclusive evidence
of the practicability of obtaining a warrant, and
consequently precluded the legality of the warrant-
less search in light of the Court's formulation of the
warrant exceptions3
Coolidge v. New Hampshire5 is another decision
in a long line of cases since Weeks v. United States'
7
which recognizes and applies the exclusionary rule
as a remedy for fourth amendment violations.M In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agen t 9 the Supreme
Court established yet another remedy--a federal
action for damages against the individual federal
officers involved.
Bivens was arrested in his apartment for alleged
narcotics violations. The arresting officers hand-
cuffed him in front of his wife and children, threat-
ened to arrest them, and thoroughly searched the
apartment. Bivens was then taken to the federal
courthouse where he was further searched, inter-
14 While the practicability of obtaining a warrant is a
very important factor, it is not the only consideration.
For example, even when officers come upon evidence
"inadvertently" it is very possible that it would not
be removed, altered, or destroyed and that they could
return for a warrant. But, the "inadvertency" doctrine
articulated by the Court does not require such. At the
same time, though, it does appear that the mobility
doctrine and the practicability of obtaining a warrant
when an automobile is involved go hand in hand.
35 If the police had not obtained a warrant, they could
have virtually assured legality of the seizure by claim-
ing inadvertence under the plain view doctrine.
36 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
37 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the Court established
the exclusionary rule for use in federal cases. Mapp. v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the rule to the states.
"8 We therefore reach the conclusion that the let-
ters in question were taken from the house of
the accused by an official of the United States
acting under color of his office in direct violation
of the constitutional rights of the defendant.
... In holding them and permitting their use
upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was
committed.
232 U.S. at 398.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
rogated and booked. He was released and the
charges were later dropped.
Bivens brought suit in federal district court,
alleging that his fourth amendment rights had been
violated, and asked for $15,000 damages from each
of the arresting officers. The complaint alleged that
the officers secdred neither an arrest nor search
warrant and that they lacked probable cause for
both. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action.40
While the fourth amendment is concerned with
the prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure,
the injuries received from the violation of the
fourth amendment by federal law enforcement
officers are those of state common law tort actions
such as trespass of property and invasion of pri-
vacy. The Supreme Court determined that the
rights involved under the fourth amendment are
different from these state tort actions4' and thus
decided that a federal cause of action claiming only
the violation of fourth amendment rights is neces-
sary to the full vindication of those rights." In addi-
tion, in order to support its claim that it had the
power to establish this cause of action, the Court
cited cases in which remedies have been provided to
promote policies embodied in federal statutes where
the Congress had failed to make enforcement provi-
sions clear."4 Justice Harlan, in a concurring opin-
ion, probably best expressed the Court's senti-
ments, observing:
It is apparent that damages in some form is
the only possible remedy for someone in Biven's
alleged position. It will be a rare case indeed in
which an individual in Biven's position will be
able to obviate the law by securing injunctive
relief from any Court. However desirable a direct
4Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 409 F.2d
718 (2d Cir. 1969). The court reversed, though, the
lower court's decision that it lacked jurisdiction.
41 [T]he Fourth Amendment operates as a limita-
tion upon the exercise of federal power regardless
of whether the State in whose jurisdiction that
power is exercised would prohibit or penalize
the identical act if engaged in by a private citi-
zen.
403 U.S. at 392.
4Whether necessary or not, the decision conflicts
directly with earlier dicta in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. at 398:
What remedies the defendant may have against
[the policemen] we need not inquire, as the Fourth
Amendment is not directed to individual miscon-
duct of such officials. Its limitations reach the
Federal Government and its agencies.
" See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
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remedy against the Government might be as a
substitute for individual official liability, the
Sovereign still remains immune to suit. Finally,
assuming Biven's innocence of the crime charged,
the 'exclusionary rule' is simply irrelevant. For
people in Biven's shoes, it is damages or nothing."
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger ex-
pressed reservation about the Court's decision, con-
sidering it a direct infringement on the legislative
function. 45 The Chief Justice took the occasion,
however, to express his disenchantment with the
exclusionary rule. He observed that deterrence of
unlawful police action is the rationale most fre-
quently advanced to support the suppression doc-
trine,46 but that it is not empirically supported.'
Furthermore, he maintained the exclusion of evi-
dence fails to punish the wrongdoing official and
instead often releases the defendant. 4" In addition,
it fails to protect innocent persons who are the vic-
tims of illegal but fruitless searches.4" Conse-
quently, the Chief Justice suggested that the Court
abandon the exclusionary rule and exhort Congress
to establish an administrative or quasi-judicial
remedy against the government itself."0
There is much support for the argument that
present tort remedies provide little relief for in-
jured parties. 51 Equally ineffective have been the
"403 U.S. at 409-10.
45 We would more surely preserve the important
values of the doctrine of separation of powers-
and perhaps get a better result-by recommend-
ing a solution to the Congress as the branch of
government in which the Constitution has vested
the legislative power.
Id. at 411-12.
46 Id. at 415.
47 The Chief Justice cites as support Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Ride in Search and Siezure, 37 U. Cnr.
L. R-v. 665 (1970). Professor Oaks' detailed study
concluded that there was no evidence that the exclu-
sionary rule deterred unlawful police action, but it also
concluded that there is no evidence that it does not.
48 403 U.S. at 413, citing Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
41403 U.S. at 413.
"I Id. at 422-23. The Chief Justice's suggestion con-
sists of five parts:
1) Waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal
acts of law cnforcement officials.
2) Creation of a cause of action for damages upon
violation of the fourth amendment by govern-
ment agents.
3) Creation of a quasi-judicial tribunal patterned
after the Court of Claims.
4) Elimination of the exclusionary rule.
5) Provision that the remedy is in lieu of the exclu-
sionary rule.
51 See, e.g., Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations
of Individual Rights, 39 MtmN. L. Rx-v. 493 (1955);
Schad, Police Liability for the Invasion of Privacy, 16
Clav.-MAn. L. R.v. 428 (1967); Comment, Federal
federal statutes making police officers criminally
liable for violating fourth amendment proscrip-
tions 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (19 64)u attempts to
eliminate some of these problems by providing for
damage suits against state officers similar to the
action now established by the Court in Bivens
against federal officers. Nevertheless, in Pierson v.
Ray,M the Supreme Court limited the effectiveness
of § 1983 by granting the officers the defenses of
good faith and probable cause. Also, § 1983 actions
are subject to the same problems inherent in other
civil actions and, therefore, there is little reason to
suspect that this new cause of action will be any
different.
The Chief Justice's proposal would ostensibly
eliminate some of these drawbacks, 55 but even as-
Jurisdiction-Suits Against Federal Officers for Viola-
tion of the Fourth Amnendment, 48 N.C. L. Rzv. 705
(1970). Cited as reasons are the fact that juries tend
to prefer the cause of the policeman to that of the sus-
pected criminal, policemen are better able to defend
themselves than plaintiffs are able to sue, actual dam-
ages are usually slight and hard to prove and punitive
damages are difficult to obtain absent willful or mali-
cious action on the part of the perpetrator.
18 U.S.C. § 2234 (1970) reads in pertinent part:
Whoever, in executing a search warrant, will-
fully exceeds his authority or exercises it with un-
necessary severity, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year.
18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970) reads in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of
the United States or any department or agency
thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of
the United States, searches any private dwelling
used and occupied as such dwelling without a war-
rant directing such search or maliciously and with-
out reasonable cause searches any other building
or property without a search warrant, shall be
fined for a first offense not more than $1,000; and,
for a subsequent offense, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
For obvious reasons, it is unlikely that law enforcement
officials will bring suit against their fellow officers under
either of these statutes.
142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Teriltory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the de-
privation of any fights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
ble to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
16 See 403 U.S. at 423. The Chief Justice believes
that lawyers sitting on the tribunal would be less preju-
dicial to the suspected criminal than are the lay jurors
in the civil trials presently and that his proposal would
be a good way of keeping files on individual officers to
determine whether they might need further training or,
possibly, be dismissed for continued violations of in-
dividuals' fourth amendment rights.
[Vol. 62
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suming that elimination of governmental immunity
and the establishment of a quasi-judicial body are
legally desirable, the further question remains
whether or not the exclusionary rule should be con-
temporaneously abandoned. Dissenting in Wolf v.
Colorado,56 Mr. Justice Murphy presented one
viewpoint: "For there is but one alternative to the
rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at all." 5 It is
possible that Justice Murphy meant there is no
0 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
57 Id. at 41. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
alternative in the criminal setting,13 for it is clear
that for the truly innocent person whose fourth
amendment rights have been violated, "the 'exclu-
sionary rule' is simply irrelevant." 59 Therefore,
while Bivens may prove to be a rather ineffective
cause of action, it is a small step in the right direc-
tion.
18 One might wonder what the damages would be if
a person were jailed on a conviction substantially
based on illegally seized evidence.
0 See note 44 supra.
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)
The Supreme Court in United States v. Harris'
examined the constitutional requisites for issuing
a warrant upon a police informant's report. The
crux of the controversy was whether the tax
investigator's affidavit supplied sufficient facts for
a magistrate to conclude that the informant was
probably telling the truth. The Court's decision
changed direction from its prior holdings and left
uncertain the outer limits of permissible search and
seizure.
Roosevelt Hudson Harris -was convicted in
federal district court of possessing non-tax paid
liquor. The evidence introduced at trial was ob-
tained with a search warrant issued by a federal
magistrate. 3 The warrant was issued solely on the
basis of a tax investigator's affidavit, which alleged
that Harris had been known to the investigator for
more than four years as a trafficker in non-tax paid
liquor; that over this period the investigator had
received "numerous information [sic] from all types
of persons as to his activities;" that a local con-
stable had found a sizeable cache of illicit whiskey
in an abandoned house under Harris' control during
this period; and that the investigator had received
information from a "prudent" person-who feared
for his life if his name were revealed-that he had
personally purchased illicit whiskey from the
191-S. Ct. 2075 (1971).
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
3 Federal magistrates were formerly called United
States Commissioners. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V,
1969).
described residence for more than two years (most
recently within the past two weeks) and had
personal knowledge that illicit whiskey was con-
sumed by purchasers in an outbuilding, from which
he had seen Harris obtain whiskey for people on
numerous occasions.
Relying on Aguilar v. TeXas,4 the court of
appeals5 found the affidavit insufficient because no
background information was presented which
would have enabled the magistrate to evaluate the
informant's credibility.8 The court felt the state-
ment that the informant was "prudent" revealed
nothing about the trustworthiness of his informa-
tion.7 The court then considered other allegations
in the affidavit to determine whether there was
independent corroboration of the informant's
assertions. Relying on Spinelli v. United States,"
the court held that the constable's prior discovery
of illicit whiskey at some time within the past four
years was too remote9 and that the assertion that
the defendant had a general reputation as a
trafficker in illegal liquor was of no legal conse-
quence.10
4378 U.S. 108 (1964), holding that an affidavit
based on hearsay must be accompanied by facts and
underlying circumstances from which a magistrate
could draw his own conclusions about the reliability of
the information, and the credibility of the informant.
5 412 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1969).
6 Id. at 797.
7 According to the court, it signified only that he
was "circumspect in the conduct of his affairs." Id.
at 798.
8 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
9 The court declared that reliance on this assertion
would violate the principle that "probable cause must
be determined as of the time the warrant is issued."
412 F.2d at 798. See also Schoeneman v. United States,
317 F.2d 173, 177 (1963).10 412 F.2d at 798. The court stated:
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Reversing, the Supreme Court, in a splintered
5-4 decision," ruled that the informant's report
together with the investigator's personal knowledge
of Harris' activities supported issuance of the
search warrant. Speaking for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger emphasized that the fourth amend-
ment requires "practical" and "commonsensical"
interpretation, and should not be restricted by
highly technical requirements.1 The Court char-
acterized the court of appeals' objection to the
affidavit's use of the word "prudent" as a "hyper-
technicality," explaining that "a policeman's
affidavit 'should not be judged as an entry in an
essay contest,' but rather must be judged by the
facts it contains." 1
The Court likened the warrant in Harris with a
warrant upheld in Jones v. United States. 4 In Jones,
as in Harris, the warrant was supported primarily
by the affiant's recitation of an informant's per-
sonal observations,'5 or simple hearsay. However,
there was an averment in Jones that the informant
had previously reported accurately.' 6 Although
there was no such averment in Harris,1 the Court
dismissed this difference by saying "this Court in
[Tihe Supreme Court has held that this type of
statement may not be used 'to give additional
weight to allegations that would otherwise be in-
sufficient.'
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 418.
11 Only two of the four justices who concurred in thejudgment joined in the opinion of the Court, written
by Chief Justice Burger.
12 Cf. United States v. Ventruska, 380 U.S. 102, 108(1965).
191 S. Ct. at 2080, quoting from Spinelli, 393 U.S.
at 438.
'4 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
1 The Jones Court stated:
The question here is whether an affidavit which sets
out personal observations... is to be deemed in-
sufficient by virtue of the fact that it sets out not
the affiant's observations but those of another.
An affidavit is not deemed insufficient on that
score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay is presented.
362 U.S. at 269.
"1 As additional bases for crediting the hearsay, the
Jones Court also noted that the informer's present re-
port was independently corroborated and the defend-
ant was known to the police as a narcotics user. Id. at
271.
7 "It will not do to say that warrants may not issue
on uncorroborated hearsay." 91 S. Ct. at 2082. Harris
concluded that it did not matter that the magistrate
did not see the informant or know his name, for the
police themselves "almost certainly" knew his name.
According to the Court, id., the case of McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967), "disposed of the claim
that the informant must be produced whenever the de-
fendant so demands."
Jones never suggested that an averment of previous
reliability was necessary." 18
The Court used the Jones analogy to distinguish
Harris from Spinelli by pointing out that in
Spinelli there was no averment of personal observa-
tion by the informant nor were there facts support-
ing the assertion that Spinelli had a reputation with
the officers for illegal activities.19 More difficult to
square with Spinelli was the Harris Court's willing-
ness to consider the investigator's averments con-
cerning Harris' reputation. In Spinelli the Court
dismissed as "bald and unilluminating" the asser-
tion that the suspect was known as a gambler.20
This apparent inconsistency was disposed of in
Harris by the Court's explanation that Spinelli
relied on earlier decisions"l in which evidence of
reputation was held insufficient when standing
alone, but aquired relevance when supported by
other information." If this explanation proved
unsatisfactory, the Court was willing to deal more
harshly with Spinelli:
To the extent that Spindli prohibits the use of
such probative information, it has no support in
our prior cases, logic, or experience and we de-
cline to apply it to preclude a magistrate from
relying on a law enforcement officer's knowledge
of a suspect's reputation.
The Court also observed that statements made
by the informant against his penal interestu added
to his credibility. Conceding that admissions of
crime do not always make accusations reliable, the
Court felt that the informant's admission of illegal
1a 91 S. Ct. at 2081. See note 15 supra.
19393 U.S. at 420-22.
20 Id. at 414.
21Id. See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41,
46-47 (1933).
2 The Court claimed its interpretation was approved
in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), in
which the Court held that assertions by the searching
officer that he had previously arrested the defendant for
a similar offense and that the defendant had a reputa-
tion for hauling liquor were proper in determining prob-
able cause, though such evidence would rarely be ad-
missible at trial. But see 91 S. Ct. at 2088-89, where
Justice Harlan, dissenting, distinguished Brinegar as
carefully limited to situations where the arrestees were
driving motor vehicles, 338 U.S. at 174, adding that the
Court in Brinegar held the arrest valid "wholly apart
from [the agent's] knowledge that [the suspect] bore the
general reputation of being engaged in liquor running."
Id. at 170.
n 91 S. Ct. at 2082.
24 Informant's admissions, if true, constituted an of-
fense under LNT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 5205(a) (2), which




purchases "itself and without more" furnished
probable cause to search.
25
Justice Harlan, joined by three justices in his
dissent,2 concluded that the affidavit failed to
provide a magistrate with information adequate
for an independent determination of the infor-
mant's reliability.? Since the determination of
probable cause is made by a magistrate, not the
affiant, the affiant's determination that the
informer was "prudent" was insufficient to allow
the magistrate to draw his own conclusion. Harlan
observed that, though there might be some signifi-
cance to the informant's unusually detailed de-
scription, that alone was insufficient to support
credibility, since such statements would easily
occur to a person prone to fabrication. The opinion
concluded that this aspect of the affidavit could
not by itself "enable a man of reasonable cau-
tion" 28 to uphold a warrant without opening the
door to little more than "florid" affidavits as
justification for search warrants.29
The dissent also rejected the two factors which
the majority felt established creditable background
on the defendant. Regarding the past discovery of
illicit whiskey in an abandoned 'house "under
Harris' control," '0 Harlan observed that even a
past conviction could not provide probable cause
25 91 S. Ct. at 2082. Conceding that the informant's
statements may not be admissible at trial, the Court
stressed that the issue in warrant proceedings is not
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that probable cause for
believing a crime has occurred. See Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Donnelly v. United States,
228 U.S. 243 (1913); 5 J. WIGMORE, EvmmcE § 1477
(3d ed. 1940). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. at 173.
26 91 S. Ct. at 2083.
27 Harlan maintained that a magistrate could prop-
erly issue a warrant only if he concluded:(a) [T]he knowledge attributed to the informant if
true, would be sufficient to establish probable
cause; (b) the affiant is likely relating truthfully
what the informer said; and (c) it is reasonably
likely that the infornier's description of criminal
behavior accurately reflects reality.
91 S. Ct. at 2083-84. The dispute in this case centered
around the last point. According to Justice Harlan, no
one disputed that the first two points were not sup-
ported.
23 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). The
Court stated:
Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment
exists where the facts and circumstances within the
affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient unto them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has been committed.
1191 S. Ct. at 2087.10 See id. at 2078.
for searching a suspect's home some years later."
The second factor, a claim by the affiant that he
had received other information"2 about the sus-
pect's criminal activities, was dismissed by the
dissent as a mere suspicion, insufficient on the basis
of prior Supreme Court holdings to establish
probable cause for issuance of a warrant."
Justice Harlan also took the majority to task for
giving so much weight to the self-incriminating
nature of the informant's statements, in light of the
government's failure to even raise the issue.
Furthermore, there was no reason to think the
informer would necessarily assume his statements
might be harmful to him. 4 Justice Harlan felt that
the employment of uncorroborated hearsay to
support a finding of probable cause would require
an extensive relaxation of the rules of evidence.
35
Justice Harlan did not'share the government's
belief that an affirmance of the court of appeals'
opinion would hinder federal law enforcement. He
suggested that informers could be brought before
magistrates to allow the magistrates to determine
the informer's credibility for themselves or that
federal agents could give the magistrates enough
background information on the informants, includ-
ing general reputation, previous reliability and
sources of information, to allow them to make
independent determinations of reliability. 6 He
"1 Harlan expressed disbelief: "I can only conclude
that this argument is a make-weight, intended to avoid
the necessity of calling for an outright overruling of
Spinelli." Id. at 2088.
2 See note 30 supra.
3See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 414;
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. at 47. Regarding
the majority's argument that Nathanson was limited to
holding reputation standing alone was insufficient, the
dissent concluded that this was the exact problem here
-only the suspect's reputation was seriously invoked
to establish the informant's credibility.
Harlan observed:
[W]here the declarant is also a police informant it
seems at least as plausible to assume ... that the
declarant-confidant at least believed he would re-
ceive absolution in return for his statement....
91 S. Ct. at 2087.
25 And these rules cannot be completely relaxed,
of course, since the basic thrust of Spinelli,
Aguilar, AYatItantson, Whiteley v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560 (1971), and Giordenello v. Unitcd
States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), is to prohibit the
issuance of warrants upon mere uncorroborated
hearsay. The simple statement by an affiant
that he and another had committed a crime,
where offered to prove the complicity of the third
party, is little, if any more than that.
91 S. Ct. at 2083 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Girondenello
and Whiteley involved arrest rather than search war-
rants, but similar methods were used for determining
probable cause for issuance. See also note 25 supra.
"1 Expanding on this, Harlan stated:
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concluded that the warrant in Harris could not be
sustained "without cutting deeply into the core
requirement of the Fourth Amendment" that such
warrants issue only upon independent conclusions
of magistratesY
In approving the issuance of the warrant in this
case, the Court delegated a substantial portion of
the magistrate's judicial duty to a law enforce-
ment officer. Although the Court did not specifi-
cally overrule Aguilar or Spinelli,38 Harris is not
easily reconcilable with their common thesis that a
judicial officer make a wholly independent deter-
mination of probable cause before issuing a
warrant. In accepting uncorroborated hearsay as a
proper basis for issuance of a warrant the Court has
raised the possibility of acceptance of almost any
kind of allegation to establish probable cause.
Harris set no outer bounds showing the minimum
information required for the issuance of a warrant.
The Harris decision gives heightened importance
to another warrant case the Supreme Court
decided three months earlier. In Whitely v. War-
den 9 the Court held that an arrest warrant issued
solely on the basis of a sheriff's conclusion that two
men had committed a crime, with no facts, cor-
I do not understand why a federal agent, who has
determined a confidant to be 'reliable,' 'credible,'
or 'prudent' cannot lay before the magistrate the
grounds upon which he based that judgment. I
would not hold that a magistrate's determination
that an informant is 'prudent' is insufficient to sup-
port the issuance of a warrant. To the contrary, I
would only insist that this judgment be that of the
magistrate, not the law enforcement officer who
seeks the warrant.
91 S. Ct. at 2090.
37 While the fourth amendment does not specifically
call for independent conclusions of magistrates, the
Supreme Court has held this factor imperative to safe-
guard fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Ripper v. United States, 178
F. 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1910).
The point of the Fourth Amendment which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it de-
nies law enforcement the support of the usual in-
ferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those in-
ferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magis-
trate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.
333 U.S. at 13-14. See generally FED. R. CRiu. P. 3-4.
38 Justices Black and Blackmun, concurring sep-
arately, indicated that they would directly overrule
Spinelli. Justice Black added that he would also over-
rule A guilar.
"401 U.S. 560 (1971).
roboration, or mention of an informant, was
invalid. 4 The sheriff was, in fact, acting on an
informant's tip, but he did not advise the magis-
trate of this and the Court, citing numerous prior
decisions including Spinelli, Aguilar and Jones
held that there were not enough facts in the
complaint to support an independent judicial
conclusion as to probable cause for issuance of a
warrant.
Before Harris, the result of this case would
appear reasonably obvious based on the Court's
prior decisions. After Harris there is some doubt.
Three justices dissented from the holding in
Whiteley.4 justice Black based his strongly worded
dissent on the fact that the sheriff requesting the
warrant had received a tip, evidence was found
when the suspects were arrested, and the suspects
were arrested by officers responding to a bulletin
who did not know the basis on which the warrant
had been issued. Black dismissed the fact that
there was no information from which a magistrate
could have drawn his own conclusions as to
probable cause for issuance of the warrant. 3
In light of the Harris decision, Whiteley may
give some indication of the minimum information
which the Court, at this time, would require
before a magistrate could issue a warrant.
0 The sheriff's complaint which provided the basis
for the arrest warrant read:
I, C. W. Ogburn, so solemnly swear that on or
about the 23 day of November, A.D. 1964, in the
County of Carbon and State of Wyoming, the said
Harrold Whiteley and Jack Daley, defendants, did
then and there break and enter a locked and sealed
building [describing the location and ownership of
the building].
Id. at 563.
4 justices Black and Blackmun and Chief Justice
Burger dissented.
4Justice Black opened his dissent by stating:
I am constrained to say that I believe the decision
here is a gross and wholly indefensible miscarriage
of justice. For this reason it may well be classified
as one of those calculated to make many good peo-
ple believe our Court actually enjoys frustratingjustice by unnecessarily turning professional crim-
inals loose to prey upon society with impunity.
Id. at 570.
3Citing Justice Clark's dissent in Aguilar, 378 U.S.
at 116, and his own dissent in Spindli, 393 U.S. at 429,
Justice Black declared:
My disagreement with the majority concerning
the wisdom and constitutional necessity of a 'little
trial' before a magistrate or justice of the peace
prior to the issuance of a search or arrest warrant is




United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
James White was convicted in district court of
violating federal narcotics laws.' Federal Bureau of
Narcotics agents testified over objection to in-
criminating statements made by White and trans-
mitted by an electronic eavesdropping device worn
by a government informer.2 The informer was not
available at the trial to testify as to his conversa-
tion with White.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction and
remanded for a new trial. 3 The circuit court, sitting
en banc, was of the opinion that the surreptitious
electronic monitoring of White's conversations by
federal agents violated his fourth amendment
rights, since it had not been authorized by a
warrant. In invalidating the agents' testimony as
evidence against White, the circuit court majority
relied on the principles of Katz v. United States.4
The electronic surveillance of White's conversa-
tions was held to be protected by the warrant
requirements of the fourth amendment because
"[a] realistic appraisal of the defendant's conduct
permits no other conclusion than he justifiably
expected his conversation to be private." 5
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit's ruling in United States v. White.8 Mr.
Justice White, in an opinion joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Stewart and Blackmun, spoke
for the Court, and separate opinions concurring in
the result were filed by Justices Brennan and
Black. In his plurality opinion, Justice White held
that the testimony was admissible because the
principles of Katz, upon which the court of appeals
had based its, decision, could not be applied
retroactivelyY Justice White then went beyond the
'White was convicted of violations of 21 U.S.C.
§ 174 (1964) and IzT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 4705 (a).2Conversations between White and the informer were
monitored by federal agents on eight separate occa-
sions.
3 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
4389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5Id. at 846. The Court of Appeals held:
On the basis of the Constitutional principles set
forth in Katz and our understanding of the protec-
tion which the fourth amendment was drawn to
provide, we are of the opinion that the surrepti-
tious monitoring of the defendant's conversation
was a naked violation of his rights and that the re-
sultant seizure of his statements was not made in
conformity with the provisions of that amendment.
Id. at 848.
6401 U.S. 745 (1971)
7 Desist v. United States. 394 U.S. 244 (1969). The
Court held that Katz applied only to electronic surveil-
lance subsequent to the date of the Katz decision. Id. at
246. Further discussion of the Court's application of its
narrow issue of retroactivity to address the more
difficult questions posed by the application of
fourth amendment protections to instances of
third-party eavesdropping. He argued that the
testimony of federal agents as to incriminating
statements overheard by warrantless electronic
eavesdropping, where one of the parties to the
conversation acquiesced in the monitoring, was
admissible and did not violate fourth amendment
protections.8 Justice Brennan concurred solely on
the separate ground that Katz should not be applied
retroactively,9 while Justice Black concurred in the
result on the grounds that the fourth amendment
could not be expanded to protect against electronic
surveillance. 0
In dissent, Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Mar-
shall argued that Katz should be applied retro-
actively, and then went on to challenge the
plurality's discussion of the scope of the fourth
amendment's protection in electronic surveillance
cases." Justice Harlan found that the decisional
basis for Justice White's opinion had been signifi-
cantly altered by more recent cases,12 while Justice
Douglas emphasized the need for judicial super-
vision of electronic surveillance to prevent the
chilling of free speech. 3 Justice Brennan agreed
decision in Desist v. United States may be found in
United States v. Williams, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
11401 U.S. at 753.
9 Id. at 755.
10 Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result on the
basis of his dissent in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 364 (1967). There he concluded "the Fourth
Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping."
Id. at 366. In Mr. Justice Black's analysis:
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only
to the extent that it prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers,
and effects. No general right is created by the
Amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited
power to hold unconstitutional everything which
affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well ac-
quainted as they were with the excesses of govern-
mental power, did not intend to grant this Court
such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The
history of governments proves that it is dangerous
to freedom to repose such powers in courts.
Id. at 374.
11401.U.S. at 766, 793 (Douglas and Harlan, J.J.,
dissenting). See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
255 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 256 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing), 269 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (1969).
12 401 U.S. at 777-80. See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41(1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
13 401 U.S. at 760, 762-63. Douglas argued that Katz
and Berger were of a different "vintage" than Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), and On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), on which the ma-jority relied. See 401 U.S. at 751.
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with the dissenters in their discussion of the fourth
amendment issues.14
The retroactivity issue aside,' the importance of
While rests with the fact that it offers insight into
several justices' thoughts on the question of fourth
amendment rights in the area of overheard con-
versations. The basis for the differences between
the plurality and the dissents lies in the history of
two developments in the law of search and seizure:
the right of the individual to be free from warrant-
less electronic surveillance and the right of the
government to use undercover agents to gain
incriminating evidence from unwitting suspects.
Electronic eavesdropping is a modem phenom-
enon. The development of the law with respect to
judicial limitation of the government's use of
electronic devices to obtain information without a
warrant has therefore been slow. Until recently, it
was necessary that a physical penetration of
defendant's property occur for a warrantless
government search and seizure to violate the fourth
amendment. In Olnstead v. United States,18 the
defendant's telephone was tapped by government
agents who subsequently testified to incriminating
statements he made on it. In rejecting the de-
fendant's contention that the wiretap was an
invasion of the defendant's right to privacy, Chief
justice Taft, speaking for the Court, stated that
"the [Fourth] Amendment itself shows that the
14 401 U.S. at 755.
11 In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969),
the Court's decision in Katz v. United States was given
prospective effect only. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 629 (1965), the Court first established the
rule that the "Constitution neither prohibits nor re-
quires retrospective effect." Shortly thereafter, in
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Court
fashioned three requirements to judge whether a case
should be given prospective or retroactive effect. The
factors were:
(a) [TJhe purpose to be served by the new standards(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the-old standards, and (c) the effect
on the administration of justice of a retroactive ap-
plication of the new standards.
Id. at 297.
The Court in Desist held that all three of these factors
militated against a retroactive application of Katz. 394
U.S. at 250. In separate dissenting opinions, Justices
Douglas and Harlan objected to the fact that the de-
fendants in those cases which were pending review at
the time Katz was decided were not afforded the same
relief as petitioner Katz. Id. at 255, 258. Since United
States v. White was pending review after Katz was de-
cided, that case, under the rule announced in Desist,
could not be applied to White. See generally Hadad,
"Retroactivity Should be Rethought": A Call for the End
of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. Calm. L.C. & P.S. 417
(1969).
16 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
search is to be of material things." 17 Since the
defendant's conversation was defined not to be
material, the government's wiretapping activities
were held to be constitutional.
Cases subsequent to Olmstead interpreted that
holding to require either the seizure of "physical"
property or "physical" penetration or "trespass"
on defendant's property for a violation of the
fourth amendment search and seizure clause by
the government." The first of these requirements
was modified in Silverman v. United Slatesy9 where
the Court held for the first time that a conversation
could be the object of an unlawful search and
seizure even though it was not "physical" prop-
erty.
20
The second of these requirements, that an actual
physical penetration occur, was overruled in Kalz v.
United States,2' where agents had attached a
recording device to the outside of a telephone booth
from which petitioner was making a call. Justice
Stewart abandoned the view that any non-tres-
passing surveillance was constitutionally per-
missible.2 Instead of the trespass inquiry, he
followed a "justifiable reliance" analysis to deter-
mine whether an individual's fourth amendment
right to privacy had been invaded by electronic
devices." The Court reversed petitioner's convic-
tion using this analysis, holding that his justifiable
expectation of privacy had been violated when his
conversation was "seized" without a search
warrant.a
A second line of Supreme Court cases, which
dealt with fourth amendment limitations on the
government's use of informers, is equally applicable
. Id. at 464.
"
8 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,
751 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
135-36 (1942).
19365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman, District of
Columbia police inserted a spike with a microphone
attached to it under a baseboard in a room which they
expected the defendant to occupy shortly. Id. at 506.
On the basis of this "physical intrusion", the Court
ruled that the police activities deprived the de-
fendant of his fourth amendment right to privacy.
Id. at 509.
11 Id. at 509. See Berger v. New York, 388 V.S. 41, 51(1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485
(1963).21389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Id. at 355.
21 Id. at 353.
The Government's activities in electronically lis-
tening to and recording the petitioner's words vio-
lated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus consti-





to White. The first of these decisions, On Lee v.
United States,25 involved a factual situation almost
identical to United States v. White. In On Lee, as in
White, an informer equipped with a transmitting
device engaged a suspect in conversations which
were transmitted to a nearby federal narcotics
agent. 16 The petitioner argued that the penetration
of his premises by a government informer carrying
an electronic device constituted a "trespass"
under the pre-Katz view of the fourth amendment
and that even without a physical trespass, the
Court should overrule its previous cases holding
warrantiess wiretapping to be permissible under the
fourth amendment. The Court rejected petitioner's
first contention on the ground that the "trespass"
of the electronic device was vitiated by the fact
that the government informer entered the peti-
tioner's premises with his consent 3' However, the
physical penetration doctrine was subsequently
overruled in Katz.2' With respect to the petitioner's
argument that the Court's prior decisions excepting
the wiretapping of conversations from fourth
amendment proscriptions should be overruled, the
Court strongly disagreed that an analogy should
be made between wiretapping and operating a
radio set." The Court went on to suggest that in
any event there was no difference between a
government agent listeniig in on a conversation
through a two-way radio or through an open
window."'
In Lopez v. United States," the Supreme Court
again concluded, in a factual context similar to
that in On Lee, that the activities of the govern-
ment informer were proper and required no war-
rant. The only factual distinction between On Lee
and Lopez was that in On Lee the defendant's
conversation was being simultaneously trans-
mitted on a two-way radio,3 ' while in Lopez his
statements were being taped on a recording device
carried by the informer.P Speaking for the Court,
Mr. Justice Harlan virtually ignored the On Lee
decision in holding that the risk that the defendant
assumed that what he was saying would be relayed
to the government was the same whether the in-
former reported the conversation to the authori-
25 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
28 Id. at 749.
27Id. at 7-52.
21389 U.S. at 353.
29 343 U.S. at 753-54.10 Id. at 754.
31373 U.S. 427 (1963).
32343 U.S. at 749.
3 373 U.S. at 430.
ties from memory or reproduced it by a tape re-
cording. 84
Finally, in Hoffa v. United States,35 the Court
measured the "risk" which the defendant assumed
in terms of "expectations of privacy" and rejected
the notion that the fourth amendment protects
such expectations. In Hoffa, a government informer
was successful in his efforts to befriend the de-
fendant in order to gain access to incriminating
conversations. The Court, over the strong dissent
of Chief Justice Warren, 36 rejected the argument
that Hoffa's friendship with the informer raised the
level of his expectations of privacy and held that
the fourth amendment was never intended to
protect mere expectations.37
In United States v. White, the Court was faced
with a factual situation which fell squarely between
the government informer line of cases, consisting of
On Lee, Lopez, and Hoffa, and the electronic
surveillance cases of Silverman and Katz. The
defendant's statements were made in the presence
of a government informer, but his statements were
electronically seized by the government without a
warrant. Because the factual situation in the first
of the government informer cases, On Lee, was
essentially the same as that in White, the issue was
whether On Lee, either by itself or read together
with Hoffa and Lopez, was overruled by Katz v.
United States. If On Lee were not overruled, there
was no fourth amendment violation in White.
In addressing this issue for the plurality, Justice
White acknowledged the fact that insofar as the
Court in On Lee relied on the physical penetration
doctrine to uphold the government's electronic
eavesdropping, that decision was overruled by
Katz.3' Justice White found, however, that not all
of the On Lee decision was attenuated by Katz.39
The defendant in On Lee had asked the Court to
rule that his fourth amendment right to privacy
had been violated irrespective of whether there
was a physical trespass by the government. 4 This
was the same argument facing the Court in White.
The Court in On Lee responded to this argument by
T Id. at 438-39.
35 385 U.S. 293 (1966).3 ' Id at 313. According to the Chief Justice:
An invasion of basic rights made possible by pre-
vailing upon friendship with the victim is no less
proscribed than an invasion accomplished by force.
Id. at 314.3 'Id. at 302.
31401 U.S. at 750.3 'Id.
40 343 U.S. at 753.
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stating that the simultaneous monitoring of
defendant Lee's conversation had "the same effect
on his privacy" as if he had been overheard by
someone outside his window,4' which is constitu-
tionally permissible under the fourth amendment.
Relying on this statement in On Lee, Justice
White reasoned that the use of devices aiding
observation or auditing of defendants engaged in
private conversation was not a forbidden search
and seizure because the effect on privacy was the
same as it would have been without the use of
those devices." Disclosure by an agent who used a
listening device therefore had the same effect on
the privacy of the individual as disclosure by an
informer who was a party to the conversation. This
was an implicit holding in Lopez v. United States."
Furthermore, since Hoffa v. United States held the
activities of government informers to be outside
the ban of the fourth amendment," it followed that
if the effect on privacy was the same whether or
not the informer carried an eavesdropping device,
the Hoffa protection extended to informers with
eavesdropping devices.
The plurality rejected the court of appeals'
application of Katz to the factual situation in
White on the ground that Katz "involved no
revelation to the government by a party to con-
versations with the defendant." 45 The plurality
noted that Katz did not hold that a person has a
"justifiable and constitutionally protected expecta-
tion" that a party with whom he converses on the
telephone will not reveal the contents of that
conversation to the police.46
In dissent, Justices Harlan, Douglas and Mar-
shall, joined by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion, pointed out that the plurality had mis-
apprehended the theoretical underpinnings of
Katz v. United States. In Katz, the Court had ruled
that the government's activities in electronically
listening in on the conversation of the defendant
"violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied" in violation of his fourth amendment
41 Id. at 754.
2401 U.S. at 751.
4See 373 U.S. at 438. The Court was concerned pri-
marily with whether it was constitutionally proper for
the informer's evidence to be introduced at all. The de-
vice was found to be used merely to insure the relia-
bility of the evidence. Id. at 439.
4385 U.S. at 302.
15 401 U.S. at 749.
46 Id. See 389 U.S. at 351. Justice Stewart held that
the fourth amendment protects people, not places, so
that "[wlhat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." Id.
rights.4 Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Harlan
reasoned that the theory behind Katz was derived
largely from Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez v.
United States in which he had asserted that the
fourth amendment must be evaluated in terms of
the risk to which the expectation of privacy is
subjected."1 Under this analysis, the protection
which the fourth amendment affords to an expecta-
tion of privacy should be measured in terms of the
reasonableness of that expectation and the extent
to which it is threatened by government activity.
The dissenting justices and Justice Brennan
regarded the threat from electronic eavesdropping
to the individual's expectation of privacy to be so
substantial as to require a warrant,4 irrespective of
whether this activity is accompanied by the
presence of a government informer.
The dissenters further criticised the plurality for
its reliance on On Lee v. United States. Justice
Harlan referred to the statement of the On Lee
Court alluded to by the plurality as a mere "un-
elaborated assertion" which had no bearing on
the disposition of that case. He emphasized
the fact that Katz did not attempt to validate such
a ground for decision.51
Neither the plurality nor the dissent was able to
reconcile its position with former Supreme Court
rulings. Basing its position on prior government
informer cases, the plurality dismissed Katz as
factually inapposite to the case at hand." As the
dissent correctly noted, however, Katz cannot be
distinguished away so easily. It is difficult to
delineate intellectually a difference in the "expecta-
tion of privacy" expressed in Katz merely by adding
a government informer. If the fact of the electronic
surveillance itself raises the level of that expecta-
tion of privacy, the presence of a government
informer cannot be seen as affecting the suspect's
4 Id. at 353.
11401 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., concurring), 759(Douglas, J., dissenting). See 373 U.S. at 450.
"401 U.S. at 756 (Brennan, J., concurring), 760(Douglas, J., dissenting), 789-90 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). In Lopez, Justice Brennan found it unreasonable
that
[T]he risk that third parties, whether mechanical
auditors.., or human transcribers of mechanical
transmissions.. .- third parties who cannot be
shut out of a conversation as convential eaves-
droppers can be, merely by a lowering of voices, or
withdrawing to a private place-may give inde-
pendent evidence of any conversation. There is only
one way to guard against such a risk, and that is to
keep one's mouth shut on all occasions.
373 U.S. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 401 U.S. at 774.
51Id. at 775.
52Id. at 749.
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